The counterattck north of Lyman is a small area in the grand scheme. And if you’re looking for signficance, you shouldn’t over react to the push-pull of front lines in small sectors.

But - there is maybe a story behind the story here. Several stories.

  • The closest you’re going to get to The Truth and an honest insight of Russian thinking and awareness is probably an aggregate of similarly timed and themed milblogger Telegram channel freakouts.

  • There’s a brittle chauvanism to the Russian invasion mindset that doesn’t respond well to ANY step backwards. That’s a very inflexible way to fight a near-peer war of conquest. It also indicates a weakness - Ukraine doesn’t have to fully expel the Russians to 2014 or 1991 borders for Russia to consider it a defeat. They treat every retreat like an irreversible loss with shrieking hysterics, searching for scapegoats. And usually at the opeational command level, which is kind of dumb. The failure may manifest there, but the real blame is several layers higher in the chain of decision makers.

  • Ukraine remains capable of coordinated manueuver warfare. This is after a period where it seemed both sides seemed to accept that mutual drone mass has made zone operations fairly moot. And maybe it is - but that lapses in that drone mass coverage create opporutnity that conventional thinking considered a thing of the past. Ukraine isn’t in a mere “hold on” phase - they are capable of offensives, and they may be growing stronger as Russia’s man-intensive horde war approach is weakening.

  • Taking several steps back - the Russian anxiety reacting to a localized rollback at least implies a palpable fear of a ‘turning point’. One that is past ‘culmination’, where you stop advancing, and instead suggests you’re at a point where you start to lose significant pockets that would require limited reserve strength you might not even HAVE to try to get back. That could create a dangerous domino effect both on the physical front lines, and in the collapsing confidence of a slow-but-inevitable strategy of grinding ever forward over a presumably weaknening ukraine.

  • For all the talk of a September mobilization, it hasn’t happened yet. And the first fresh conscript, whose combat effectiveness is highly debatable, wouldn’t arrive to reinforce failing fronts for several months from this sentence if mobilization were announced. Nor is there much certainty that mobilized conscripts would be any good as assault forces in the first place to underwrite Russia’s “grind forward, meat bags” strategy. How many more pocket collapses might happen before those conscripts who have less support, less equipment and poorer leadership even arrive at the front to replace the low-funcntioning grunts that are currently being blasted into canned pasta in charred piles of timber and blasted concrete right now?

In short - they are not moving forward and are starting to move backwards. Slowly, then quickly.

That all implies a collective fear among Russky milbloggers that they understand their entire position and philosophy is very fragile. There’s lots of examples in history where a small local defeat reinforces a wider fear that the entire approach to the war is pointless.

It’s very possible that a few collapsed pockets clustered together makes Russia finally accept defeat and screw off home.

The courage that the Ukrainians show every day is truly historic stuff. Slava Ukraini.

  • doo@sh.itjust.worksM
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    2 days ago

    What’s crazy is that they redid everything from scratch at least already two times, but both times they got exactly the same as before.

    • TwinkleToes@lemmy.caOP
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      1 day ago

      To your point here that they don’t seem to be able to effectively, fundamentally change their approach. A better writer than me once described it really well - namely that Fascist and generally corrupt regimes love the aesthetic of militarism, but aren’t able to commit to the disciplines to make it actually work well. They’re bored by less sexy concepts that are CRITICAL to sustained state warfare like industrial efficiency, logistics, banking systems. Since they’re in mafia goon states that protect the leader, theft is expected and they incentivize blind loyalty over competence, systemic corruption limits how good they can ever be at those critical pillars.

      Instead, they love army parades, tanks rolling through their capital in crisp order, aircrat fly-bys, drilled march stomping past proud leaders in big hats, with an absurd panopoly of medals hanging off their barrel chests and bloated bellies. Often there are frankly silly videos of their (often shirtless) special forces karate chopping boards, jumping around and doing feats of coordinated athleticism that don’t really translate to effective battlefield tactics. You see this all the time with North Koreans, Belarussians, Middle eastern Arab armies of the 70’s/80s and even the Russian VDV. Prancing around to choreographed pulse-pounding music, leaping through hoops and showcasing their high kicks. That doesn’t really help you seize airfields, avoid drones and flush out trenches. They’re a circus, not a professional army.

      But sustained, large scale conflicts requires way more than for-show armies whose real function is internal repression to keep the regmine safe, while also NOT allowing charismatic, capable commanders who could threaten The Leader to emerge. Quite the contradiction. The quality of The Average Fighting Man in a corrupt, authoritarian regime starts low and can never really get that high. Since Power is the organizing principle of these societies, authority flows upwards and those who don’t have it are treated like trash. They get poor training, poor leadership, poorly supplied and supported. Because…the whole point of the society is to hoard power and authority, not delegate it down to be wasted on the low-functioning grunts. THEIR job is to obey orders and die - and they know it. So what’s the incentive for them to train hard and be really effective soldiers? None - so the ones that survive are the ones with the skills to avoid being sent on suicidial assaults. Put simply - they aren’t incentivized to fight that well.

      This is a story as old as time, and is why throughout history slave armies almost always lose to citizen armies where the power dynamic is REMOTELY comparable between the two sides. You know, that old saying about an army of sheep led by a lion will beat an army of lions led by sheep. It’s been true since the days of the Greeks - soldiers fight harder for their identity and their freedom than they do to avoid the lash and just for the simple paycheck. Especially when they know their less-than-impressive commanders who don’t give a damn about them, and are ordering them to die are in the rear stealing the best food and lodging for themselves.

      Went way off on a tangent there - but to your point - why don’t they seem to learn anything? The Russian army may be capable of evolving Tactically, but with their entire brutalist psyche where the point of power and authority is to hoard it, the quality of the Average Figthing Man trying to just earn a check or avoid punishment can never be anywhere near as high as someone fighting an existential war of surivival and cultural identity in their homeland.