Unless you have something like a WW1->22 year gap->WW2 situation, it’s not going to be a factor. You cannot convert infants into soldiers that quickly. Plus, raising kids consumes resources, near-term. If he managed to get every single child-bearing-age woman in Russia pregnant this year, Russia might have a lot more human capital down the line, but until the kids are in the workforce, they’re a resource drain, not a source of more resources. He probably doesn’t need more of a drain on resources in the war.

He can maybe try to start to shape Europe for conflict a couple of decades down the line, but even then, it won’t be this war, and he probably won’t be alive to see it. The man is 73.

You might get more births, but the problem is that it’s hard to both be a mother and be going through education, and you are putting a lot of your economic output at stake if you aren’t educating your females, because they’re half of your population.

I’d still do it in a society if there were no other working options to maintain a population, but I think that it’s liable to be very costly.

I’d be a lot more willing to (a) try to structure society to encourage births immediately post-education and (b) to shift more childrearing responsibility onto the state and have situations where there’s a greater ratio of children to adults in childrearing, like more of a daycare/boarding school type structure on steroids.

Those are going to have their own drawbacks. Sparta separated mothers from children at a pretty young age and had the state raise them. Israel’s kibbutzim movement tried communal childrearing, but it failed.

There’s obviously going to be risks inherent in reducing the role of the family structure.

But trying to roll things back…

You have to ask whether those risks rise to the very substantial portion of your GDP that you’re liable to be risking if you wind up seriously clobbering female education. We did used to have much higher fertility rates, younger mothers, larger families. So we know that we can very probably achieve higher birthrates that way if you roll things back. But we also used to have a much-less-educated female population, didn’t have that output. It’s not at all clear to me that you can achieve the fertility via that route without also sacrificing the education and the attendant economic output. If you blow something like half of your economic output on this and it turns out that you didn’t need to do so to bring demographics back into a sustainable state, it’ll be a lifetime before you can restructure society to get that output back.

Drones are no longer super cheap. They need to survive electronic warfare and that hardening costs a lot.

I don’t think that Shaheds need to be able to have a datalink home to operate. I remember reading about one that shot down or was crashed being found by Ukraine that did have some kind of radio, cell or Starlink or something, but I believe that that was the exception, that normally they just fly a preprogrammed path to a preprogrammed destination.

You might be able to disrupt the satellite navigation system that they’re using, make them rely on inertial navigation. But it doesn’t have the kind of dependency that the FPV drones do.

Their burn rate — they don’t get consumed unless they hit a Shahed or crash or something — is going to be comparable to Russia’s Shahed burn rate, so if they can saturate the country, then things become comparable.

The problem is that getting to that saturation point would require sticking them all over. And if Russia comes up with some adaptation to counted, you have a huge inventory that either has to be updated or might be obsoleted.

I suspect — I haven’t been reading about them — that they have them in target cities right now, which helps — however Russia intends to get to a target, they still have to fly to the target, end of the day. However they still gotta spread them out that way among potential targets, and in addition will have less time to do intercepts. If a couple hundred Shaheds strike at once, you’ve got a coordination problem for the STING operators, so that they aren’t all trying to chase the same Shahed. If they can be intercepting them midway, that gives them more time to bring the Shaheds down.

Compared to something like traditional aircraft interceptors. Compared to, say, a SPAAG or many other static defenses, it’s long-range.

Ah, yeah, that’s interesting.

I bet that one of those would also be bad news for, say, an unwary attack helicopter; the attack helicopter can outrun it if it knows that it’s coming, but a $2,500 man-portable surface-to-air drone with a 20 km range has got to make attack helicopter crews a lot more twitchy; that’s got more than double the range of a Stinger and can maneuver around terrain.

Hmm.

My own guess has been that interceptor drones are probably going to need to be part of any successful counter-drone system, but for a different reason than Ukraine has been using these: because any fixed ground-based air defenses can only cover a small area. The attacker can choose their point of attack, and can concentrate their attacking drones there, whereas the defender has to spread out their defenses.

But the STING things are pretty short range when it comes to that problem.

Given that Ukraine’s got a solution for Shaheds, I wonder how viable it would be to operate a “mother ship” for these? That is, have a reusable fixed-wing aircraft — probably unmanned, maybe jet powered to make it faster — that can carry a load of STING drones. Act as a data relay for them, too.

Once a mass of incoming Shaheds are detected, it takes off, flies to a point in front of them, and then drops STING drones; it could even keep flying along with a mass of Shaheds and releasing more STING drones. That gives the STING operators more time to intercept and lets Ukraine concentrate their inventory of STING drones where the attack occurs.

Sounds like some kind of oil port facility, according to this:

https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/law-order/3696965-ukrainian-drone-strikes-shake-russian-port-of-novorossiysk

A Ukrainian drone attack on Friday damaged three apartment buildings, an oil depot, and coastal structures in the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Fragments hit apartments, smashing windows but causing no injuries. An oil depot and coastal structures were also damaged. Further details remain sparse.

The drone attack also affected an oil depot within a trans-shipment complex and coastal facilities, though specifics on the extent of the damage have not been disclosed.

EDIT: Here’s something from a more-respectable source:

https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-drones-damage-ship-dwellings-oil-depot-russias-novorossiysk-2025-11-14/

Ukrainian drones damage ship, dwellings, oil depot in Russia’s Novorossiysk

Nov 14 (Reuters) - A Ukrainian drone attack early on Friday damaged a ship in port, apartment buildings and an oil depot in the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, injuring three crew members of the vessel, Russian officials said.
The operational headquarters of the Krasnodar region said on Telegram that the three injured crew members were being treated in hospital.

It said drone fragments hit at least four apartments, smashing windows but causing no injuries.
The attack also triggered a fire at an oil depot in a transshipment complex, which was brought under control by emergency crews. The operational headquarters said coastal structures were also damaged, but provided no further details.
Reuters could not verify the account of the attacks and there was no immediate comment from Ukrainian officials.

EDIT2:

https://kyivindependent.com/russian-oil-terminal-in-novorossiysk-on-fire-following-ukrainian-drone-strikes/

Russian oil terminal in Novorossiysk on fire following reported Ukrainian drone strikes

The attack hit the Sheskharis oil complex, where infrastructure facilities were damaged and a blaze broke out.

Markov, who is known to maintain ties with Azerbaijan’s political elites, is thought to have fallen out of favour after relations between Moscow and Baku dramatically soured.

Imprisoning people with ties to Azerbaijan probably isn’t going to improve relations.

Russia can’t even make its own drones - it needs Iran.

Russia received Shahed design work from Iran, and IIRC may have received some manufactured drones as well early on, but my understanding is that at least the Shahed-style drones that it is using now are indigenously-manufactured and have some modifications. We know where the factory is.

kagis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HESA_Shahed_136

Russia has made much use of the Shahed 136/Geran-2 in its invasion of Ukraine, especially in strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, and mass-produces its own version.

The U.S. Army unclassified worldwide equipment guide states that the Shahed 136 design supports an aerial reconnaissance option,[19][20] although no cameras were noted in the Geran-2 in Russian service.[21]

Geran-2 is the name of the weapon in Russian service and later versions manufactured in Russia.[15][34] Russia has significantly hardened and upgraded the Geran-2 from the Iranian design over many iterations, and has become independent of Iran in its development and manufacturing.[35][37]

By October 2022, a Times of Israel correspondent noted that the Iranian navigation system made from civilian components had been replaced with a Russian manufactured flight control unit and microprocessors, using the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system rather than US civilian grade GPS, seemingly improving its loitering munition capability.[38][39] Geran-2 has labeling and paint color matching Russian rather than Iranian munitions,[40] some painted black for night operations.[36] No cameras or short-range sensors were noted in 2022.[21]

By November 2022, Russia and Iran had agreed to the Russian manufacture of the munition, with Iran exporting key components.[40][41] The Russian manufacturing facility is in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Tatarstan, with a target of building 6,000 Geran-2s by summer 2025.[42][43]

In July 2023, UK based Conflict Armament Research studied the remains of two Geran-2s used in Ukraine, concluding they were a new variant manufactured in Russia. They found “major differences in the airframe construction and in the internal units” compared to earlier examples studied, including a fuselage now made of fiberglass over woven carbon fiber rather than lightweight honeycomb. A third of the components showed manufacturing dates from 2020 to 2023, and three Russian components showed dates from January to March 2023. Twelve components showed dates after the start of the invasion in February 2022. Some internal modules were the same as in other Russian weapon systems, including the Kometa satellite navigation module.[44][45]

The Russian-manufactured Geran-2 is believed to have a “state-of-art antenna interference suppression” system that suppresses jamming of the satellite navigation position signal, designed by Iran using seven transceivers for input and an FPGA and three microcontrollers to analyse and suppress any electronic warfare emissions.[46] As of late September 2023, Russian forces have reportedly started packing warheads with tungsten ball shrapnel, similar to the M30A1 and M30A2 series of GMLRS warheads. According to Ukrainian officials the Russian modifications included “new warheads (tungsten shrapnel), engines, batteries, servomotors and bodies”.[47]

As of October 2023, Russia had significantly hardened and upgraded the Geran-2 in several iterations, though the authors of an occasional paper in 2024 estimated this had increased the production cost from $30,000 to about $80,000. One such upgrade is for a scout Geran-2 to conduct an electromagnetic spectrum survey, transmitting back to assist in safer route planning for follow-on munitions.[35]

In May 2024, a version of the Geran-2 with a heavier 90 kg warhead was reported. This version has relocated internals and a smaller fuel tank, so has a reduced range likely greater than 1,000 kilometres (620 mi), still capable of reaching all areas of Ukraine. A 52 kg thermobaric warhead option was also reported. This version may be painted black for night operations.[34][36] By May 2025, the 90 kg warhead version had been widely deployed, particularly against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure.[48]

In September 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the remains of a shot down Geran 2 included a Starlink satellite communications system providing internet connectivity over Ukraine, presumably to support real time video or electromagnetic spectrum surveys. Previously communication experiments had been conducted with 4G modems on the Ukrainian mobile phone network.[49][50]

In May 2025, The Kyiv Independent quoted Ukrainian mobile air defense sources stating that at night the drone had started avoiding strong light sources en-route, prompting air defense units to use some night-vision devices instead of searchlights.[51] In June 2025, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine was reported to have examined a new type of Geran-2, which they called the MS series, which had an infrared camera and a Nvidia Jetson based computer capable of video processing and autonomously finding targets. It also had a radio modem capable of transmitting video and telemetry. This new drone has been used to scout routes prior to other attacks, scanning for mobile air defence units.[52]

As of late spring 2025 Russia has been producing around 170 Geran-2 drones per day, with indication that a total of around 26,000 Gerans were produced by Yelabuga drone factory.[53][54][55] Defense Intelligence of Ukraine estimates 40,000 Geran-2 and 24,000 cheaper Gerbera decoy drones are planned to be manufactured in 2025.[56]

All that being said, I don’t disagree with the broader point that Russia has gone into serious decline as a weapons exporter. I remember seeing someone — maybe a Perun video — showing shifting marketshare.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FK-2000

Apparently it’s a new, export-only system.

It sounds like it’s on its way to a zoo.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukraine-rescues-camel-used-russian-120337258.html

The Telegraph understands that the camel was found in the north-east of Ukraine, near Kharkiv, and may now be on its way to Feldman Ecopark in Lisne, just outside the city.

I don’t think that it has a lot of direct relevance for Ukraine. The two projects in question (tsunami weapon on a torpedo for undersea delivery, nuclear-powered cruise missile) will exist to try to retain a credibile delivery platform for Russia’s nuclear deterrent in the face of US anti-ICBM stuff. The idea would be that if the US does a first strike on Russia, the US couldn’t necessarily intercept all of the response if the response includes unconventional delivery platforms.

EDIT: I’d also add that I’m skeptical that they’re going to be very reliable themselves as a counter to the US — I am very comfortable saying that if the US can shoot down fast-moving aircraft and counter submarines capable of firing depressed-trajectory SLBMs, that that it can probably manage to counter nuclear-powered cruise missiles and intercontinental nuclear torpedoes. Still, adding a new delivery platform might impose asymmetric costs on the US. Easier to develop a system that can shoot a bullet at someone than to develop one that can reliably shoot it out of the air mid-flight.

There are C-130s all over the world, and that’s all you need, if you’re going to use Rapid Dragon. I’m sure that they could get ahold of some.

My impression is that Rapid Dragon was really designed to allow the US to “surge” a massive number of launches at once using the large US air-logistics system, though, to overwhelm air defenses. I don’t know whether it’s necessarily the best way to launch Tomahawks. I assume that air-launching them might give them more range, if it’s not a problem to fly at altitude, but also make the launch more-visible.

Aside from naval launchers, we did have a Tomahawk ground launcher used to launch nuclear-warhead-equipped Tomahawks. That isn’t around any more, but it’s clearly technically viable to ground-launch them.

EDIT: Hmm. Two days ago:

https://oshkoshdefense.com/oshkosh-defense-introduces-the-family-of-multi-mission-autonomous-vehicles-fmav-at-ausa-2025/

At AUSA, Oshkosh will showcase three production-ready variants from its FMAV portfolio:

• Extreme Multi-Mission Autonomous Vehicle (X-MAV): The Oshkosh X-MAV is a purpose-built, autonomous-capable launcher solution that is engineered to support the future of long-range munitions. With a robust chassis for the heaviest payloads, proven off-road mobility, and integrated onboard vehicle power, it’s the ideal foundation to support the Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher Heavy (CAML-H) program for multi-domain missions and formations. The X-MAV will be displayed for the first time with four Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles.

EDIT2: I’m not sure that you can launch Tomahawks from Rapid Dragon, though.

looks further

Ah. Apparently there are existing, in-inventory ground-based-Tomahawk launchers of another sort, and it’s actually been discussed re: Ukraine.

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/spare_us_lrf_launchers_make_tomahawk_real_option_for_ukraine-15980.html

Tomahawks for Ukraine now more plausible U.S. reportedly found surplus ground launchers just a month ago

EDIT3: It looks like the US Marines started using these two years back:

https://news.usni.org/2023/07/25/marines-activate-first-tomahawk-battery

EDIT4: And apparently they just stopped using them, as per the defense-ua.com article above:

Just a month ago, the U.S. Marine Corps decided to abandon the LRF (Long Range Fires) launcher for Tomahawk.

The reason was poor cross‑country mobility on soft ground critical for Marines who would need to land LRF units on a beach. That limitation is less of an issue for Ukraine. Moreover, it is unlikely Ukraine could receive original LRFs anyway, because the LRF is a remotely operated ground vehicle based on the JLTV. The platform itself could still be useful to the Marines for an NMESIS concept with NSM anti‑ship missiles. But the Tomahawk launch system itself which can be mounted on virtually any wheeled chassis is exactly what Ukraine would need.

Russia restricts Telegram…amid push for domestic alternatives

Wasn’t Telegram done in Russia?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)

Telegram (also known as Telegram Messenger) is a cloud-based, cross-platform social media and instant messaging (IM) service. It was originally launched for iOS on 14 August 2013 and Android on 20 October 2013.

Telegram was founded in 2013 by Nikolai and Pavel Durov.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Durov

Durov was born in Russia, where he co-founded the social networking site VKontakte (VK) in 2006. He left VK in 2014 following disputes with the company’s new owners and increased pressure from Russian authorities, which also led him to leave the country. In 2013, he and his older brother, Nikolai Durov, developed Telegram, and in 2017, they moved to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where its headquarters are now located.[6]

Ah. So they did make a domestic alternative and then managed to antagonize the creators sufficiently that they left the country.

Based on a pass with Google Translate from “The bishop is a chesspiece in chess”, I think that Occitan is l’evesque and Breton eskob.

Federal prosecutors allege that Taylor Adam Lee, who is an active-duty service member stationed at Fort Bliss and possesses a very high, top-secret clearance, offered assistance to Russia and sent technical information about the M1A2 Abrams tank online in June.

Roman Rozhavsky, assistant director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, said in a statement Wednesday that Lee provided the information to the individual he believed worked for Russian intelligence in exchange for Russian citizenship.

The really stupid thing about this is that I seriously doubt that there’s anything significant that Russia wants and doesn’t have on the M1A2 in 2025. I mean, the tanks are all over the place. ISIL captured some. Russia has captured some in Ukraine, though I dunno if those were all M1A1s — I remember that Ukraine asked for M1A1s instead of M1A2s because they’d get them sooner. A ton of people have access to them. Like, you’re trying to give away information that probably has no value to Russia.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substitute_natural_gas

Substitute natural gas (SNG), or synthetic natural gas, is a fuel gas (predominantly methane, CH4) that can be produced from fossil fuels such as lignite coal, oil shale, or from biofuels (when it is named bio-SNG) or using electricity with power-to-gas systems.

So we’ve got “gas” in the US (short for “gasoline”), which is a liquid. There’s liquified petroleum gas (LPG), which is also a liquid. And there’s synthetic natural gas.

EDIT: Bonus: my understanding is that in Germany, an unqualified “gas” tends to refer to natural gas, which Germany is presently importing in liquid form (liquified natural gas, or LNG).

https://old.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/1lf63hv/whats_gasoline_called_in_each_asian_countries/

It sounds like it’s not entirely consistent across China and the translation is somewhat-debatable, but a translation for China might be “gas-oil”, “stone-oil”, or “steam-oil”.

https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/imports/russia

2021 imports from Russia: $30.8B

2022: $15.1B

2023: $4.9B

2024: $3.7B

The largest 2024 import appears to be fertilizer.

For exports to Russia:

2021: $6.39B

2022: $1.72B

2023: $0.597B

2024: $0.526B

The largest export appears to be “optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus”.

So, yes, there’s still trade, though it’s greatly reduced from 2021.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcha_Real

The Marcha Real (Spanish pronunciation: [ˈmaɾtʃa reˈal]; lit. ‘Royal March’) is the national anthem of Spain. It is one of only four national anthems in the world – along with those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, San Marino and Kosovo – that have no official lyrics.[2] Although many different lyrics have been made for it in the past, it has never had official lyrics as a national anthem.[3]

This seems, as the kids say, sus.