Having worked a wage slave summer job assembling fireworks, you eventually get comfortable. Usually complacent too, which isn’t great in a factory but there’s standards like spark prevention and max magazine size that keeps most accidents inconsequential.

In a battlefield tho, 100% not. The rule of “If you didn’t see it placed there, it’s booby trapped” should be universal, doubly so if you’re handling UXO.

What the hell is he dragging? It looks too big to be TM-62, MON-200 maybe?

The stupidity never ceases to amaze…

Pure guess, but they might perceive the FPV falling out of the sky as an EW kill/signal loss, which is temporary, leaving an otherwise functioning drone uncomfortably close by just waiting for a clear signal from the pilot.

First guy had the right idea with the long stick to try and trigger the impact detonator, but then picked it up… Russians please continue, I see no issue with hand carrying UXO. Your friends also want to see it!

People were trying that last year already, together with the arms deliveries. Until you came along and fucked with everything.

There must be a specific phrase or stolen-language word for this idiocy, because ‘hubris’ ain’t cutting it. To assume that everyone is wrong for doing it X way that you quickly do a 180 on, only to slowly realize the reality that drove everyone else’s decisions.

And then slowly and very publicly course correct back to ‘the way things were’ while never coming to terms with your mistake.

Article 13 - Humane treatment of prisoners

…prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

Vague, and open to interpretation. Which is why the 2020 addendum was added:

It is thus necessary to strike a reasonable balance… [between] making information regarding prisoners of war public, especially given the high value of such materials, and the possible humiliation and even physical harm they may cause to those who appear in them. Accordingly, any materials that enable individual prisoners to be identified must normally be regarded as subjecting them to public curiosity and, therefore, may not be transmitted, published or broadcast.

Imo there’s a big difference from parading PoWs through your towns and cities for your citizens to insult and degrade, to a photo shared of bound and blindfolded combatants freshly captured, versus a dude voluntarily talking to the camera. Intent matters for mens rea, though that’s never an exoneration.

I’d save the smoke for the (reciprocal, but still) strikes against each other’s urban centers. Just like it’s not cool for an Iskander to hit a Kiev train station, it’s not cool for a Foxbat packed with explosives to target an apartment tower Moscow.

1. Astoundingly stupid to leave super valuable attack/multirole helicopters out in an open field, after years of HIMARS gobbling up anything worthwhile in range. Keep doing Russian things Russia

2. Those are fuuuuuuucked. I doubt they’ll be able to even pull a single spare part off these, those tungsten penetrators do some work. There’s a (SFW) video of a vatnik who’d been assigned to repair a KAMAZ after being HIMARS’d and he was cussing out his commander lmao

“Look at this shit, everything is fucked… it pierced the turbine, holes in solid cast iron fuck. “Restore” are you joking, there’s nothing to “restore”.

The Soviet Union was huge, and dispersed tanks in a multitude of storage depots. Russia is big, and inherited most of them, in varying condition.

Covert Cabal does a good high level OSInt overview, but here’s a list of everything.

Genuinely not trying to nit pick but:

1. Your link is broken/bad copy-paste - it’s the same link for both citations - share plz?
2. Pravda is the Ukrainian state media. Not to say it’s a 100% unfounded propaganda mouthpiece, but I wouldn’t consider Voice of America or Radio Liberty unbiased and take their word without independent verification. They have a vested interest in spinning reality to make themselves look favorable (which is logical during war) whilst maintaining enough credibility to not be outright dismissed.

I had cautious optimism for the 2023 counteroffensive, but I got hugboxed by my own media bubble. I still think the war is Ukraine’s to win (provided they aren’t abandoned by us) and they play their cards strategically.

In contrast, here’s the RUSI take

There is a limit to how successful Ukraine can be. It was suffering from a shortage of troops to rotate and hold the line prior to its operation in Kursk. Now it has pulled together what was available as an operational reserve and committed it to a new axis. There is a limit to how far this force can push before it overextends, meaning it will need to dig in soon if the Ukrainians are to hold the ground until negotiations. But as soon as the front stops being dynamic, the Russians will dig defences and then bring up artillery, electronic warfare complexes and fresh troops. In the short term, the operation has diverted the weight of Russian air-delivered bombs away from Donbas, but this will be temporary. Russia has enough personnel and equipment to fight both fronts. It is less clear that this is true for Ukraine.

The counter-invasion makes sense for several reasons: It demonstrably shows how weak russia is, acts as a bargaining chip in potential negotiations, proves russia won’t go nuclear for something even as ‘egregious’ as boots on the ground in the motherland, and it did relieve pressure on other areas of Ukraine’s defence.

But - was it worth it? To use precious armor and elite units and put them there, to contest a decent amount of territory and replenish the exchange fund with mobliks? Swelling the line of contact and putting yourself on the logistical back foot - no longer able to abuse interior lines while defending a salient encirclement?

It would have collapsed other russian fronts had it not been for NK reinforcements being brought in.

I’m going to call citation needed on this, I never heard anything like that analysis from the sober voices like RUSI. Relieve pressure in the Donbas and force Russian attention sure, but never cause a Kharkiv style collapse.

IMO Kursk is critical to Trump’s reversal on forcing peace immediately. He doesn’t want to appear to support weakness and so won’t be caught standing next to a bully that just had pants pulled down around their ankles.

I buy the vibes argument somewhat - Trump has been all over the map on foreign policy without a discernible through-line, but he also took a reputation beating due to his former stance of capitulation. And he’s not exactly standing tall with unlimited support like Taiwan or Israel gets:

Trump himself had said on the campaign trail that he would get the fighting stopped within 24 hours of taking office, but when asked more recently how soon he could end the conflict said: “I hope to have six months. No, I would think, I hope long before six months.”

Defining a timeline just means Russia has to stretch themselves to be ‘winning’ on the face of things and look to have a strong negotiating position.

Ukraine’s professional military core eroded, replaced by mobilized teachers, drivers, farmers, and IT workers.

That’s very demeaning of the Ukrtainian army and leadership. But now you apparently agree the criticism in the article is exaggerated?

I mean, it’s not. Stop just looking at the ‘sexy’ units like 3rd Assault or the Davinci Wolves and pay attention to the regular guys in the trenches or manning the somewhat calm areas of the line - like the TDF. Middle aged men who were welders, bus drivers, famers, store clerks, etc wearing 2014 era digicam uniforms often still holding AK-74s, in poorly built fighting positions, with trash everywhere in the open - why? Poor supply and poor leadership. If you’re not fighting you should be sleeping or digging/improving your FP. Well trained and disciplined troops with NCOs on the line would not permit that.

So what are we actually disagreeing on? The article is trash, and you show nothing to contradict that, seems like you just had a knee jerk reaction.

The article (though heavily needing citation throughout) mostly fits with the informal conversation you can hear from the smaller Telegram channels run by actual soldiers, instead of PR arms of the state/brigades; we are tired of ineffective command treating our lives callously to cover their own failures/ineptitude. And that there is no exit from frontline except via death, crippling injury, or reassignment for the lucky.

This line was the kicker for me from the article, and is exactly the kind of blind hope that I initially started this conversation criticizing:

This fed a dangerous optimism about the upcoming counteroffensive – some even predicted it would end the war and push Russian forces out of Crimea.

Reality proved very different. When these ambitious goals proved impossible, the narrative had to change. Leaders started talking about capturing Tokmak instead – a much more modest objective.

This moment marked a turning point in Western support.

Emphasis mine. The meming of invincible Ukraine against fleeing Russians was foolish, overbuilt expectations, and when the 2023 counteroffensive fell on the Surovikin line, Western leaders had a much harder time selling support of the war domestically as an immediately winnable fight, instead of the protracted attritional conflict of industrial, financial, and manpower capacity that it is.

I generally don’t pick apart someone when they’re mostly correct lol

Yes, the Ukrainians didn’t say “not one step backwards, Stalingrad Bahkmut must hold” but let’s be real. They should have retreated to Chasiv Yar and other better defensive positions a lot sooner.

It was crucial to show the Russian people that they are not invulnerable, and expose the Russian war propaganda… Admittedly I thought the effect in Russia would have been bigger, but apparently Russian propaganda is quite effective

That is because you fundamentally misunderstand the relationship average Russians have with their state. Russians know their leadership is corrupt, that Moscow takes the loot and leaves dirt for the provinces, that corruption is rife, and that they are largely on their own. As a nation with conscription, many get their taste of the state either via (the widespread practice) of bribing a doctor/officer to deem you unfit for service, or via the brutal hazing system inside the military - at age 18.

This lesson of entrenched corruption is reinforced again in later life, over and over, until the idea of generals or politicians getting caught with huge dachas or suitcases of money is normalized - expected even. Why don’t they speak up or rebel? Because political engagement has proven to routinely be either controlled opposition kept impotent by the state, elections are overtly rigged - or like Navalny and many before him, personal involvement in a direct challenge is dangerous to your survival. Or they go Grozny, Bucha, Ossetia, etc on you if your locale tries to breakaway from Russian dominationz

Russia apparently were leaving areas seemingly relatively poorly defended, probably because they thought a Ukrainian attack into Russia was unthinkable under the conditions of western support.

What were Freedom of Russia raids then? What is the “banditry” Putin claimed as a rationale for the renewed offensive in the north in 2023-2024? The border was known as porous and lightly defended, but a Ukrainian counter-invasion was unseen because… it didn’t make sense. Even as a bargaining chip in the inevitable negotiated end, Russia still holds the big cards and they’re sympathetic as the whole of their strategic hand. The Donbas enables the land bridge to Crimea, Crimea gives the Black Sea Fleet an uncontested route in/out of the Sea of Azov, all of which keeps the mineral loot in the Donbas. The Russians have no wiggle room to negotiate territory, and keep their goals intact. And besides, we all saw how Russia honored the Minsk agreement with Ukraine, why negotiate in good faith with a bad actor?

Another way it’s a good move IMO, is that for a period of time, a significant part of the war has been on Russian ground, which eases the pressure on Ukrainian land.

Yeah, how’s that working out chief? The Donbas is still slowly eroding, and those Strykers, Leopards, and Bradleys aren’t coming back. Nor are the well trained soldiers that were sent in the initial Kursk push.

It’s very arrogant IMO to claim Ukrainian leadership is incompetent and flawed

I didn’t, though I recognize the 3rd party political optics of “selling” the war/victory to western backers has curbed their choices, the role of politics on the battlefield has been hobbling. The prolonged defense of Bahkmut is a perfect example - though it may have directly lead to the Wagner coup and Putin further isolating and neutering his generals, that is an unforeseen boon, not a planned outcome. The propaganda/dick measuring of that city was needless for at least the last two months, given that Chasiv Yar is the actual linchpin on terrain and logistical reasons.

considering they have managed to hold back a many times bigger force that had prepared for this war for years. And despite that they still hold after almost 3 years now, and it looks like Russia is the more likely to lose.

Which will be lauded in history, probably for centuries. As they should be, to grow from of the ashes of Yanukovic’s puppet leadership and stand tall was, and is incredible. Zelenskyy gets his deserved flowers but Hostomel doesn’t get enough credit imo, that was where it was really blunted in the first hours.

Obviously, but how do you propose to defend against Russia without losses? Ukraine has done extremely well, way better than anyone could reasonably have expected. How do you imagine they could have done better? Surrender?

Eyyy there it is. Any criticism is defeatism/bad faith.

I’m an internet commenter, not someone read in on US and Ukrainian state secrets. I don’t know if the Kharkiv offensive could have gone far further based on Russian strength or Ukrainian material on hand from allies, but I can see that the rear defenses were neglected after that ground was won because of over optimism. Same in Avdiivka last year, or the other example I gave of political and/or propaganda decisions instead of realism.

Ultimately it’s our fault for not supplying everything, everywhere, all at once, but again - in the early days the US intelligence community felt that the actual use of nukes was a coin flip. Push Putin too hard, too fast and he’ll actually fall back on the trump card.

Oh look, yet ANOTHER war crime from Russia

• Unsolicited attack against a sovereign nation
• Disproportionality when attacking civilian infrastructure and life
• Use of chemical weapons
• Inhospitable conditions for prisoners of war
• Use of torture against prisoners of war
• Extrajudicial execution of prisoners of war
• Willful and deliberate targeting of civilians
• Ecological terrorism

And add it to the list:

• Perfidy

Not true, Bakhmut cost Russians way more, and tactical retreat was done to avoid unnecessary losses.

Cost more numerically, yes. But if your opponent at Bahkmut is Wagner + armed convict meat waves, and it’s costing you regular and decently trained soldiers and mobilized personnel it is not a good trade, even at 5:1. When your opponent has a military aged male population of roughly 80 million, whilst you have at best 20 million MAMs, you need to be more selective in how you spend lives and materiel to attain objectives. Russia has almost entirely looted their Soviet inheritance of armor, and is hobbling together any shitbox tank, BMP, or MTB with drone cages and mine rollers to throw at the front - Ukraine should be (and this year has) obliging them, grinding away at the Russians and ceding territory slowly via defense in depth. Russia cannot maintain forever, even with DPRK support, whilst China largely sits this one out and gets an economic win.

Kursk was a strategic crucial victory for many reasons

Strategic how? It was a cultural and political victory, but like many of the prestige offensives, it has cost highly skilled and well equipped troops to capture mobliks and swelled the length of the frontline that ultimately needs defending. The much theorized hope that Kursk would force Russia to slow/stop their advances in the Donbas has not played out.

Blind faith is what led to the 2023 counteroffensive being such a failure in terms of objectives, throwing the best equipped and freshest troops into the maw and getting chewed up in insanely dense minefields and a surprising breadth of Russian treeline positions lying in wait.

Bahkmut, Kursk, and the dogged bridgehead across the Dnipro by ZPP in 2023-2024 are just a few examples of moves that cost an outsized quantity of SF/men and materiel in general, NATO equipment and elite units, and marines respectively, while delivering mixed to ‘not worth it’ results imo

Ukraine has definitely had a large quantity of their highly trained and elite troops attrited and eroded - why else do we see so many recruitment openings for the more kinetic units like Azov and SF?

Retreats like from Avdiivka hurt to see, but that is the game they should be playing of defense in depth while abusing and assaulting Ru weak points as they are found.

A monologue that last SIXTY PAGES of dry exposition. Barely credible characterization from the protagonist and villains and extremely poor world building.

Anthem is her better book because it keeps to a simple short story format - but still has a very dull plot that shoehorns ideology throughout. There’s far better philosophical fiction writers out there like Camus, Vonnegut, or Koestler. Skip Rand altogether imo

And here I am arguing under a misapprehension about airburst for arty being the same ‘flying shotgun’ kinetic submunition shrapnel the British developed before WW1, or the later flechettes, instead of the 2-10 meter HE burst height used nowadays…

Thanks for the info, I have some more reading to do clearly about contemporary gunnery methods and sheafs v beaten zones

The overwhelming majority of footage I’ve seen from this war has been HE exploding at ground level, DPICM or self propelled guns are the only cases that I’ve seen evidence of programming/timing being done by gun crews.

M777 and Caesar were cheaper and more effective because both could set up quickly, fire several shells and then be gone in about a minute or two. That was quick enough to avoid counterbattery fire

They aren’t hanging around, getting feedback and adjusting fires - setup, shoot, and go. The PzHs are rare and valuable, most of what you’ll see is M777 and Caesar/Bohdana, or towed Soviet leftovers in rear areas.

This is Ukraine v Russia in nearly the third year of full scale war, not a testing ground or Able Archer ‘83. In an idea scenario airburst and/or cluster is absolutely the remedy for enemy infantry in the open, but DPICM is not universally available - nor even conventional HE for that matter, shell hunger is well documented and prolific for the Ukrainians.

Having the super spec gear is neat, but the breadth of the composition matters a lot more than the abilities of your coolest kit if it isn’t widely available.